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THE DAKOTA CIVIL CODE: MORE NOTES FOR
AN UNCELEBRATED CENTENNIAL
WILLIAM

B.

FISCH*

In an earlier article in this journal,' I sketched and discussed
the Dakota Civil Code as originally drafted for New York by David
Dudley Field, the historical and conceptual background into which
the work was cast, and some of the departures made in the Code
from what appear to have been then generally accepted common
law classifications, terminology and substantive rules. In this sequel
I propose to consider the history of the Code after its completion
in 1865 by Field's commission, concentrating on three jurisdictions:
New York, where it was rejected after twenty-five years of wearying
debate, amendment, parliamentary maneuver, and gubernatorial
veto; California, where it was adopted in 1872 and where by virtue
of a larger population, varied economy, and fairly high volume of
litigation it was put to the severest test; and the Dakotas, where it
was first adopted in 1866, periodically revised, and eventually dissolved into a consolidated code covering all subjects in an alphabetically arranged key-word format. 2 The jurisdictions are taken
in that order, so as to enable the story in each to add to the background against which the next can be discussed and evaluated.
Because New York never got beyond the proposal stage, its discussion is in more abstract terms concerning the merits of codification and of the peculiar characteristics of the proposal on paper.
Because California was a larger and more demanding state, it
took the lead over the Dakotas in dealing with the Code, influencing
the latter in subsequent amendments, though without by any means
dictating an entire approach. The Dakota experience, then, in which
we are ultimately interested, can be best understood in the light
of that of our more prominent colleagues. 3 We begin, however,
with a brief sketch of the reception given the Code in the common
law world at large.
The decade or so following the completion of the New York
Code was a period of considerable activity in the Anglo-American
* Associate Professor of law, University of North Dakota. A. B. 1957, Harvard
College; LL. B. 1960, University of Illinois; M. Comp. L. 1962, University of Chicago.
Currently on leave from the University of North Dakota as a Fullbright Scholar at the
University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany.

1. Fisch, The Dakota Civil Code: Notes for an Uncelebrated Centennial, 43 N. D. 1A
REv. 485 (1967).
2. N.D. REv. CODE of 1943; S.D. CODE of 1939.
3. The other jurisdlctions hich adopted the Code, Montana (part of Dakota until 1872).
1895; Idaho, 1887; and Oklahoma (Indian Territory), parts of the Code in 1890; will
be mentioned only in passing if at all.
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movement toward codification of the substantive private law, even
apart from the adoption of the Code by Dakota and California.
The Canadian province of Quebec, belatedly joining Louisiana and
the continent of Europe, adopted a Civil Code in 1865, just prior
to confederation, based on the Napoleonic, no doubt to some extent
influenced by the Louisiana code but more importantly reflecting
Quebec's own independent development of pre-revolutionary French
customary law. Here a major stimulus to codification doubtless
was the prospect of confederation with the English-speaking colonies,
and a felt need to testify to their cultural identity in the main area
of the law which had not been anglicized in a century of British rule.
In the British colony of India, various portions of the private
law were codified, though ultimately without being completed and
consolidated into a single Civil Code. In this case the main stimulus
appears to have been the need for modernization and unification
of a colonial legal system of great variety and complexity.'
In the United States one other general codification of the
common law (public and private) was completed and adopted in
Georgia in 1861, and was revised extensively in 1872 to eliminate
the institution of slavery and its ramifications in the law of persons,
property, etc. The Georgia code, based largely on an 1858 digest
by T. R. R. Cobb and having the appearance of a statutory rendition
of standard common law text-books, found no resonance in other
jurisdictions. 5 In the remainder of the United States most of the
activity took the form of more or less systematic compilations of
existing statutes, on the model of the Revised Statutes of New York
(1830) and the Revised Statutes of Massachusetts (1836).
In England the movement was still able to command the attention of some prominent minds, and the government as well. In
1866, a Royal Digest Commission was established with the task of
digesting the entire law of England, which many supposed would
be a preliminary to general codification. 6 The digest would be
systematic and complete in all detail, but completely descriptive;
a code would be a distillation of at least the general principles
manifested by the digested law. In response to this Commission
several substantial works were produced. Sheldon Amos in 18677
4. In 1879, when most of the codifying was done, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen described the purpose of codification in India: to provide "a body of law for the government
of the country so expressed that it may be readily understood and administered by English
and native government servants without extrinsic help from English law libraries." As
quoted by Mlbert, Indian Codification, 5 L. Q. R V. 347, 359 (1889).
5. 4See generaUy, Smith, The First Codification of the Substantive Common Law,
4 Tu. I. lEV. 178 (1930). It has suffered the same fate as the Dakota Code, in that
it was eventually transcribed into the alphabetical key-word format.
6. See 2 AM. L. RaY. 361 (1867) for the Commission's first report7.
Amos, CODIFICATION OF PRIVATE LW IN ENGLAND AND THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(1867).
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and T. E. Holland in 18698 published extensive analyses of the
question of codification in the Anglo-American system, both generally favoring the project, and Amos followed in 18799 with a
comprehensive set of guidelines for digesting and codifying English
law, on "the practical assumption that the preparation of an English
Code has been definitely resolved upon."' 1 In fact neither the Code
nor the Digest ever arrived; the Digest Commission concluded that
their task would require several hundred volumes, and that it was
beyond their capacity, and they disbanded perhaps as early as
1870.11 Some of the work done for or in sympathy with the Commission, however, was quite successful. For example, Sir Frederick
Pollock's Digest of the Law of Partnership, which first appeared
in 1874, became a standard work, formed the basis of a codified
Partnership Act in 1890, and turned into a commentary on the
statute code it had spawned. 12 In New York David Dudley Field
took note of the failure of the Commission as indicative of the
impracticability of the merely descriptive task of the digest, and
the necessity and superiority of the creative work of codification,
the crystallization of general principles in statutory form. s
In the course of this activity, frequent notice was taken of the
completed New York Code, and the judgment passed was at best
mixed. Portions of the draft Code were used as models in the
preparation of some of the Indian codifications such as the Contract
Act and the Specific Relief Act. 1 ' Holland in his essay noted that
New York "has at length caused to be compiled one of the best
codes of modern times," referring to the entire body of five codes.
With respect to the civil code he asserted:
Faults might easily be pointed out in the arrangement of
the work, which is doubtless also somewhat more roughly
put together than would be approved of in England, but
it will afford much help and
15 encouragement to our own
efforts in the same direction.
Amos's evaluation of the New York Code as a model for English
efforts was rather harsher though with similar import. In his
An English Code, he introduced an extensive discussion of specific
defects of the New York Code with some contempt:
8.

HOLLAND, Codification in ESSAYS ON THE FORM OF THE LAw (1870),

in 1869 as an article in the EDINBURGH RzvIUW,

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

As
Id.
See
See

14.

GLEDHILLo India, 6 THE

first published

No. 288.

ENGLISH CODE (1873).
at VIII.
3 ALBANY . J. 281 (1873).
POLLOCK, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (10th ed. 1915).
Codification of the Law, in 1 SpnAaus, SPEECHES, ARwUMENTS AND MISCELLAmwUS
PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, 349, 850 (1884).
BamsH COMMONWzALTH:

THE DEVzLOpMENT o

LAWS

AND CONSTTUTONS 291, '294 (2d ed. 1964). See also Gooderson, Restraint of Trade in
the Field Code, 79 L. Q. Itv. 410 (1963).
16. HOLLAND, supra note 8, at 45.
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The New York Civil Code may be described rather as a
Codification of Text-books on the English Common Law, than
as a Codification of English Common Law itself. Apart from
occasional scraps of terminology and arrangement borrowed from Justinian's Institutes and the Code Napoleon,
the whole work reproduces, in an utterly undigested form,
the notions and the very phraseology in which the English
Law is clothed in the most hastily compiled text-books. 16
And he concluded this discussion on a somewhat condescending
note, attempting to explain why such a code might be useful in
New York but definitely not in England:
The peculiar state of Society in a new and undeveloped
country makes the kind of demand very different there from
what it is here. Accessibility and verbal simplicity in Law
may be of far greater importance to a restlessly energetic
and commercial community than precision and accuracy of
expression. In England, on the contrary, - with its antiquated institutions, so fondly cherished by the mass of
the community; with its constitutional system so repulsive
of change and so jealously, as well as tenderly, watched;
-with its conservative sentiment which is strong in politics,
and all but omnipotent at the Bar,-a Code, which in every
line of it violates a familiar principle or introduces a novel
terminology, and yet is consistent in doing neither, would
never hold up its head for so much as the first hour's
debate upon its acceptance in the House of Commons."'
In the United States, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., taking up
the editorship of the American Law Review in 1870, devoted his
first major article as editor to the subject of codification. 8 In
this article Holmes took little note of the New York Code as such
choosing to make his own proposals concerning the basic structure
of a proper code rather than to dwell on the qualities of other
works. He did charge the draftsmen of the New York Code, however
with the mistake of supposing that one of the primary targets of
a code is the layman, and that therefore the code should be short
and readable and accessible to the untrained mind. Rather, asserted
Holmes, a code should try to provide the professional with a
"philosophically arranged corpus juris," and function in effect as
a training tool for the lawyer.
The perfect lawyer is he who commands all the ties between
a given case and all others. But few lawyers are perfect,
and all have to learn their business. A well-arranged body
of the law would not only train the mind of the student
to a sound legal habit of thought, but would remove
18.
17.
18.

AN ENa sH CODE, supra note 9 at 99.
Id, at 107-8.
Codw, and the Arrangeinent of the Law, 5 Am. L. REv. 1 (1870).
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obstacles from his path which he now only overcomes after
years of experience and reflection.' 9
Though he doesn't say so, it is clear from the article that he did
not consider Field's code satisfactory in this regard. His contempo20
raneous review of Holland's Essays upon the Form of the Law
indicates that he sees the English codifiers of his day as seeking
essentially the same thing, namely, a more useful form into which
to cast a legal system whose substance is at least generally settled.
It perhaps goes without saying that Holmes never succeeded in
finding that form, although he appears to have supposed that his
essay provided a framework on which someone else, with a reasonable diligence, might have built a suitable code.
There is little doubt that Field drafted his code, as Holmes
suggested, with a view toward communicating to some degree with
the untrained mind. To some extent, perhaps, he had in mind the
student of law, however inadequately as Holmes saw it; but primarily he intended the Code to be intelligible to the layman. This
purpose is betrayed already in the Ninth Report of the Commissioners, to which the 1865 draft was attached:
There are those who argue that an unwritten law is more
favorable to liberty than a written one. The contrary would
seem to be more consonant with reason. It can scarcely be
thought favorable to the liberty of the citizen that he should
be governed by laws of which he is ignorant, and it can
as little be thought that his knowledge of the laws is promoted by their being kept 2 1from print or from authentic
statement in a written form.
In a letter to the California bar concerning the Code, written
in 1870, Field was even more explicit in his assertion that one of
the purposes of codification is to make the law accessible to the
layman:
[A code] would reduce the laws of the land to an
accessible and intelligible form, and thus bring within the
reach of the people, who are to regulate their own conduct
to
by them, and who should be able, in great measure,
22
judge for themselves of their legal rights and duties.
A similar sentiment was expressed by Field in argument before
the New York legislature in 1873,22 and it is echoed at least once
by the editors of the Albany Law Journal in 1884:
19.
20.

7d. at 3.
5 Am.L. REv. 114 (1870).

21.
22.

REPORT, at VII.
SPEECHEs, ARGUMENTS

AND MIscELLANEOUS

PAPERS OF DAVID

note 13 at 352.
23. Reasons for the Adoption of the Codee, at 861, 372.

DuDiEY F'EL,

eupra
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Laws, we repeat, are not made solely or mainly for the
eleven thousand lawyers of this State, but mainly for the
other five millions of unlearned people, who are entitled to
a book of 24laws, so that they may know what and where

the law

iS.

The Code itself shows unmistakable signs of this purpose. The
inclusion of a chapter of Maxims of Jurisprudence, "to aid in the
just interpretation" of the law, would be justified primarily by the
use to which a layman might put it - a well trained lawyer of the
time would probably have been able to recite many more than
are included in this obviously non-exhaustive list. The insertion of
sections two and three of the draft, the one defining law 25 and the
other listing the sources of the law, 26 appears also primarily to
be for the layman, although there are purposes for which a judge
might wish to have an exhaustive list of sources of the law, to
know what other sources to ignore. The section defining "land" as
. the solid material of the earth, whatever may be
the ingredients of which it is composed, whether soil,
rock, or other substance [Field, Civil Code of New York
§164 (1865)]
and the section defining "that which is affixed to land"
real property along with the land itself):

(being

A thing is deemed to be affixed to land when it is attached to
it by roots, as in the case of trees, vines or shrubs; or imbedded in it, as in the case of walls; or permanently resting
upon it, as in the case of buildings; or permanently attached to what is thus permanent, as by means of nails,
bolts or screws [Field, Civil Code of New York §165
(1865)]
appear to be designed, by their high level of generality and the
use of examples to supplement definition, to communicate with the
layman. The Division on Obligations begins with a definition of
obligation which is too general and simple to be for professional
use,2' 7 as does the subheading "Contract"; 2 8 and the definition of
24.

29 ALANY IL, J. 81 (1884).

See also, Yearnan, Codification, 29 A.BANY

L. J. 26

(1884).
25.

§ 2: "Law is a rule of property and of conduct prescribed by the sovereign power

of the state." FIELD, Civi Cons op NEW Yoax 1 (1865).
§ 3: "The will of the sovereign power is expressed:
1. By the constitution, which is the organic act of the people;
2. By statutes, which are the acts of the Legislature, or by the ordinances of other
and subordinate legislative bodies;
3. By the judgments of the tribunals enforcing those rules which, though not
enacted, form what is known as customary or common law." Id. at 1-2.
27. "An obligation is a legal duty, by which a person is bound to do or not to do a
certain thing." Fnmw, Crvm CoDE oF NEW YORK § 670 (1866).
28. "A contract is an agreement to do or not to do a certain thing." FIRJD, CIVIL CODE
oF NEw Yosx § 744 (1865).
26.
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"detriment", 2 9 the key concept in the provisions on "Relief" in
Division IV, is likewise too general for the trained eye.
Similarly, there was a real attempt to achieve the simplicity
of style which characterized the French code civil - simple, direct,
short sentences, common-sense terms rather than technical, clear
divisions between basic ideas, uncrowded paragraphs - although
it was not an entirely successful one and, as the critics pointed
out, often confused rather than clarified. Two sections from the
title on Contracts will perhaps suffice to show the style at its best,
the first consciously modeled on the comparable provision of the
French code, the other apparently original:
[Section 745]. It is essential to the existence of a contract
that there should be:
1. Parties capable of contracting;
2. Their consent;
3. A lawful object; and
4. A sufficient cause or consideration.
[Section 750]. The consent of the parties to a
must be:
1. Free;
2. Mutual; and
3. Communicated by each other.

contract

THE CODE IN NEW YORK
The ninth and final report of Field's Code Commission was
submitted to the New York Legislature on February 13, 1865. The
Commission thereupon dissolved, according to the statute establishing it, and the Code spent the next fourteen years under the
legislative rug. 30 Field apparently made annual journeys to Albany
to push for its adoption, a few bills were introduced in one house or
the other of the legislature providing for adoption, and the legislature went so far in 1875 as to authorize a Law Revision Commission which it had established in 1870 to incorporate the Code
or portions of it into their final report; but nothing was done.8 1
In this period surprisingly little discussion of the Code appears in
the periodical literature. An unsigned article in the Albany Law
' 32
Review of 1870, entitled "The Civil Code of the State of New York,
discusses broadly the desirability of a code and especially of the
supposed distinction between a code and a digest,83 but has rela29. "Detriment is a loss or harm suffered in person or property." FIELD, CrIVIL CODE OF
Nuw YORK § 1833 (1865).
30. see MutU The Origin of the North Dakota Ctvil Code, 4 DAK. 1. Rv. 103, 116-17
(1932).
31. Id.
32. 2 ALa&Ny L. J. 885. 408, 450, 506 (1870).
38. Cf. AMos, supra note 9.
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tively little to say about the content of the New York Code ("our
code"). This little is, however, revealing:
The civil code recently completed by Messrs. David Dudley
Field and Alexander W. Bradford is . . . as much a digest

as a code, and has been designated by the latter title,
probably, only because the mere abstract is the nobler
element, and also because it proposes some changes in
the law. Its province as a reformer of the Law, however, is
dehors the proper function of a code. A code or digest, as
such, is merely a new mode of expressing existing and
undeniable rules ...
Possibly, the delay that has occurred in enacting the
code is owing to the fact that it deals with reforms the
utility of which is not universally admitted. . . . [W] e
think it would be far better to eliminate from the first
edition of the code all extraneous matter and proposed
changes in the law, and to have the code enacted as merely
a new form and authoritative compilation of existing rules.
This will insure the code an instant adoption.3 '
The journal continued to mention the codes from time to time,
complaining of the lack of attention given by the legislature, and
noting their reception elsewhere, but it appears to have been a
desultory business.85
The real obstacle in the way of codification,

.

.

.

as we,

in this State, have, by experience, found out, is not in the
preparation, the drafting, but in the adoption. The legislative body wants to discuss and amend and patch the work
when propounded, as they discuss and amend and patch
other bills. Mrs. Stephens [Sir James Fitzjames Stephen]
very forcibly says: 'A popular assembly might as well try
to paint a picture.'8 6
The persistence of Field and the other proponents of the Code
finally promised to bear fruit in 1879 when both houses of the legislature passed bills adopting the Code, and the issue burst out into
the open again. However, the Governor vetoed the measure, complaining chiefly of the fact that the Code changed long-standing
legal rules in several respects while professing to be friendly toward
the basic purposes of codification.37 The editor of the Albany Law
Review angrily dismissed the governor as "an opponent of codification" and called for the legislature to override the veto,88 to no
avail. By the time the Code got through both houses of the legislature again in 1882, the Association of the Bar of the City of New
84.
35.
86.
87.
38.

2 ALBANY L. 3. 385 (1870).
4 ALBANY L. J. 169 (1871) ; 5 ALBANY L. J. 69 (1872).
6 ALaBANY TA J. 398 (1872).
Mumt. supra note 80 at 117.
19 AANY I. J. 348 (1879).

UNCELEBRATED CENTENNIAL

York, which had apparently previously relied on the individual
efforts of its members, had established its Special Committee To
Urge the Rejection of the Proposed Civil Code, members of which
regularly appeared before the legislature and joined public battle.
The Association's position rested ostensibly on two premises:
first, that the proposed Code was a bad piece of work, inaccurate
in detail and inept in arrangement; and second, that codification
of the private law is undesirable in any case. It may be supposed
that the first argument carried the greatest weight with the legislature and the executive and the bar generally; judging from the
manner in which the arguments were presented, however, it seems
likely that the second proposition was the one the Association
believed in and proceeded from. The argument was presented in
a series of pamphlets and articles, spanning the decade of the
1880's, remarkable for a polemical style more typical of an advocate's brief than a scholarly, "scientific" discussion.
First and perhaps foremost, the Association complained of the
fact that the draft Code proposed to change the law in material
respects. Here the criticisms had a marked socio-economic flavor,
for the changes most heavily criticized were attempts to liberalize
some of what we would now generally agree were the inequities
and rigidities of the common law of that day. The first report
in early 1881 of the Association's Committee on Amendment of the
Law, chaired by Clifford A. Hand, is largely devoted to these
aspects of the Code. Challenged as "dangerous" and "objectionable"
for example, were section 61, which made condonation, as a defense
to an action for divorce, conditional upon continued marital kindness
on the part of the guilty party; section 77, which limited the husband's right to subject his wife's separate assets to his support
until his own assets were exhausted; section 88, which permitted
only the husband or wife or their descendants to complain of the
illegitimacy of any child born in wedlock; and section 116, making
any illegitimate child adopted by the father into his home fully
legitimate. In the law of landlord and tenant, the change singled
out for special damnation was that in section 998, which prohibited
the letting of a single room to more than one tenant, giving each
tenant in the entire building containing such a room the right to
withhold rent until the improper renting is stopped. In a later
memorandum signed by Hand alone, reaction to this provision is
voiced in the following terms:
What proper connection is there between the 'horrors'
of the tenement house and the despotic prohibition against
an economy of rent, fuel, and other living expenses, practic-
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able for two poor sewing women, with perhaps a child

apiece, by hiring each a part of a single room?3"

In the law of master and servant, the provision in section 1013
limiting contracts of personal service, other than apprenticeship, to
two years, was criticized as contrary to "natural right." In the
law of contract, the provision on usury was excoriated because
it did not abolish the prohibition altogether.
[W]hile many of the members of this association would
be pleased to see the law expunged from the statute book,
they probably agree with your Committee that this should
be done by a clear and well defined law, which not only
strikes out the provision making such a contract void, but
also removes the objectionable and unconscionable advantage
given by section 975,
which makes it 'voidable by the party
40
prejudiced thereby.'
These objections were summed up by Hand in his memorandum
as showing three particularly objectionable "general drifts": first,
the "tendency to tyranny":
Individual freedom of action, and the responsibility of the

citizen, for the care and welfare of himself, are constantly
crippled or lessened. Each man is taught to look to someone
else for whatever befalls him . . . [T]hese are but instances of the disposition to dictate to men what they may

or may not do, and to trespass upon the most essentially

valuable of all civil rights, the right to liberty of action." 1

The second tendency was "to overbear and disparage the ties
of blood," in strengthening the claims of the surviving spouse over

the heirs,' 2 in permitting adopted children to inherit,' 8 and in permitting a father to fully legitimize his bastard children and those
of his wife." The third, apparently, was blasphemy.
Such vagaries, also, as that which supposes 'irresistible

superhuman cause' to be a more reverent expression than
the 'act of God', are noticeable. This last attribution to the
39. Memorandum by Clifford A. Hand, appended to the Report of the Special Commitmittee to Urge Rejection of the Proposed Civil Code, Oct. 21, 1881, at 20.
40. Report of the Commfttee on the Amendment of the Laiv, March 15, 1881, at 15.
41. Supra note 39 at 19-20.
42. "Under such a dispensation, the labors will be lightened and the hope of gain be
better assured for adventurers who marry the aged, weak or infirm for the sole purpose
of capturing an estate which, although it may have been inherited by virtue of the ties of
blood, is made an easy prey in violation of the obligation of those ties." Id. at 21.
43. "The effect will be to expose every act of benevolence, in this form, to the peril of
consequences neither desired nor desirable. The further effect would evidently be to shut
the door of many comfortable homes to the poor and helples, who might otherwise find
them open." I&
44. "Old landed inheritances must go to bastaxds begotten during long years of absence of the husband in distant countries, rather than to his true and natural heirs ....
He would thus be enabled, almost at pleasure, to violate the wishes of the dead, who, not
deriving their views of morality and social ethics from the modern French novel, may have
in expresq terms limited their bounty to his 'lawful issue'." Id. at 20-21.
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will of the Almighty, of whatever is independent of the
human will, is, of course, a devout recognition of the divine
power, and originated with 45
God-fearing men, whose faith
was absolute and unqualified.
It was this tendency to change "essential principles" which
constituted the worst evil of codification generally, in the Committee's view, and set it off from the greatest virtue of the
common law, namely its "flexibility." The words of one of the 1828
revisers of the New York statutes were invoked for the flavor of
the contrast:
[Mr. John C. Spencer] expressed his admiration for
'that principle of flexibility in the common law, which enables it to be adapted to the ever varying conditions of
human society', and he declared it to be 'in that respect
unquestionably superior to any written code'. This flexibility,
however, he regarded as consisting 'not in the change of
great and essential principles, but in the application of old
principles to new cases and in the modification of the rules
flowing from them to such cases as they arise so as
to preserve the reason of the law and the spirit of the law.' 6
These criticisms may be supposed to have been effective in
inducing the Governor for the second time to veto the bill adopting
the Code, in July of 1882. The veto message purported to be simply
a re-referral to the Legislature, in order to make the amendments
everyone conceded would be required before adoption rather than
afterward. The message was fairly clear, however, that the changes
in the law were the chief defect to be removed.
This Bill makes many manifestly radical changes in long
and well-established laws and usages beyond what could
have been contemplated in the Constitution with reference
to codification. Ideas and principles are attempted to be
introduced which, as separate propositions in independent
Bills, would hardly command support. 47
This was the last time the Code got as far as the Governor's
desk, although in the next seven or eight years the debate continued almost undiminished and one or the other house of the
Legislature or the respective committees managed to pass or report
favorably on renewed efforts at adoption. It was in this period that
the debate evolved into an almost personal battle between Field
and James C. Carter and became most explicitly devoted to the
merits of codification generally in a common law system.
45. Id. at 22.
46. Report of the Commtttee on the Amendment of the Law, supra note 40 at 23-24.
47. Governor's message, as set forth in the Report of the Speotal Committee to *Urge
Rejection of the Proposed Civil Code 8 (Oct. 10, 1882) in BAR Asso., N.Y. CITY ON TE
CoDE 1881-89.
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In 1883, 1884, and 1885, the Association pursued the tactic of
assigning to various members of the Special Committee to Urge
Rejection of the Proposed Civil Code various portions of the Code
for detailed analysis, the results of which were distributed to legislators and lawyers as propaganda. It is clear throughout, however,
that the Association never contemplated improving the Code, only
disposing of it. Each annual report concludes with a warning similar
to that in the Third, dated September 26, 1883:
The marvelous vitality of this scheme, and the untiring
zeal of its chief promoter, in seeking to press it upon the
attention of the Legislature, warn us of the necessity of
being still prepared to meet another attempt, at the next
Session of the Legislature, to procure the passage of the
'proposed Civil Code.' To that end your Committee would
respectfully recommend that the matter be again placed in
the hands of a Special Committee, charged with the duty of
again opposing to the uttermost, every attempt to secure its
adoption.4
The main theme of the specific critiques made by various
members of the Committee on portions of the Code was that the
provisions were inaccurate and incomplete. Since these are both
relative concepts, they were based on two premises, both of which
even then, still more today, would be open to considerable question:
first, that the common law was certain and settled, and second,
that the common law was complete in detail. Typical of these
critiques, though the most articulate in this respect, was that of
Carter on the Code provisions on General Average in admiralty
law, in which he pointed out with great emphasis what he considered to'be ambiguities and errors in an eight-section passage:
. . . [T] hese eight sections contain four instances of doubtful and ambiguous meaning, involving future strife and
litigation, and four other instances of positive error, two
of which are of a character gross enough to destroy the
reputation of any treatise in which they might be found.
And this doubt, uncertainty and error it is gravely proposed

to import into a branch of the law where everything is now
certain and clear . . .49
Apparently in response to this criticism, the proponents of the
Code in 1883 tried some changes, including the adoption of standardized rules then in wide usage in admiralty, to which Carter
responded in the same vein as before and if anything with more
vehemence. To the Fourth Annual Report (1884) were appended
48. Third Annual Report of the Epecial Committee to Urge Rejection of the Propo8ed
Civil Code 8 (Sept. 26, 1883) in BAR Asso., N.Y. CxTr ON vE CODE 1881-9.
49. Id. at 23.
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papers by Theodore Dwight on Landlord and Tenant, Carter on
Insurance, W. B. Hornblower on Negotiable Instruments and Trusts,
Albert Mathews on Loan, George H. Adams on Innkeepers, J.
Bleecker Miller on Corporations. In 1885 the Fifth Annual Report
contained a lengthy analysis of the provisions on Damages by the
most widely read author of the day on the subject, Arthur E. Sedgwick. In 1888 Hornblower contributed an extensive discussion of
the provisions on Corporations. The technique adopted in virtually
all of them was to pile up all possible problems of interpretation,
all possible inconsistent authorities (however lonely), and all possible unanswered questions in an indiscriminate heap.
These papers show the Committee at its least convincing, and
from this distance valid points of criticism and improvement lose
themselves in the mass of polemic trivia. It seems likely that what
makes these papers so unconvincing to the present-day reader
(it is impossible in this compass to set forth the passages in sufficient
number to convey the flavor) is the fact that we no longer suffer
so painfully from the illusion that the law, in whatever form of
expression, is clear and certain, and are less inclined therefor
to engage in dogmatic battle as to which statement of the law on
a given point is the "correct" one. Indeed it might be said that this
dogfight between codifiers and anti-codifiers in New York in the
last quarter of the 19th century was the last gasp of the the-law-is
there-waiting-to-be-discovered school of jurisprudence, giving way
(though not without exacting its price of insight) to a legislative
50
experimentalism, fostered significantly by Holmes , in which we
are still working today. In any case, we can only note here that
such was the flavor of the debate, and that the one item missing
completely from all of these papers is any suggestion as to how
a "correct" codification in the area in question might be formulated.
The argument for which the opposition to Field remains best
remembered in the jurisprudential literature, however, is that which
denied the propriety of any codification of the common law. As
mentioned, it was one made by the Association from the first stages
of the legislative battle over the Code, and they could attribute
the idea to a New Yorker speaking in 1825. Many voices contributed
to this argument, to which Field's own writings from the submission of the Code in 1865 to his death in 1895 make crisp, logical
51
The most widely quoted
and increasingly exasperated response.
50. He began, of course, as an adherent to the historical shcool. See Codes, and the
Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L Rgv. 1-2 (1870).
51. See especially his Codification of the Common Law: A Short Reply to a Long
Essay, in 1 SPRAGUE, SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANUJUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLUT
FIELD 494 (1884). Also consult pages 809-502.
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and noted voice in the chorus was that of James C. Carter, and it
was his pamphlet The Proposed Codification of our Common Law,
published in 1884, which appears to have aroused the broadest
discussion of this issue in the New York literature. The gist of the
argument forwarded by Carter5 2- is that case-by-case judicial development of the law ("unwritten law") is a method of establishing the
law superior to that of legislative enactment ("written law"). The
common law or unwritten law, judicially developed, proceeds from
case to case, deciding only that which is before it, ready to modify
whatever generalizations it has utilized in solving one problem upon
presentation of a new case sufficiently dissimilar to the first to
warrant different treatment - bound, that is, not by the generality
of particular statements of the law but only by the generality of the
fact situations actually presented for decision. The written law,
on the other hand, proceeds on the premise:
That it has made an absolute classification of all possible
transactions; and its rules are not subject to change or
modification however ill-adapted they may prove to be to
the business of the future to which they are to be applied.
It refuses to proceed any further with the scientific method
of examining and
classifying transactions according to their
53
actual features.
This notion that the unwritten law properly operates as a science
in the modem sense, empirically, while statutory or codified law
operates as a science in the rationalist sense, deductively, is that
espoused in somewhat more intelligible language by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., in his early essay Codification, and the Arrangement
of the Law:
It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case
first and determines the principle afterwards. . . . It is
only after a series of determinations on the same subjectmatter, that it becomes necessary to 'reconcile the cases,'
as it is called, that is, by a true induction to state the
principle which has until then been obscurely felt. And this
statement is often modified more than once by new decisions before the abstracted general rule takes its final
shape. A well settled legal doctrine embodies the work of
many minds, and has been tested in form as well as subwhose practical interest it is to
stance by trained critics
54
resist it at every step.
This is the historical notion in its purest common-law form:
52.
lFor want of a copy of the 1884 pamphlet, we take aa typical his two 1889 speeches,
The Provinces of the Written and the Untwritten Law and The Ideal and the Actual in
the Law, In 24 AM. L. R~v. 1, 752 (1890), respectively.
53. The Provinces of the Written and the Unwr4tten Law, supra note 52 at 10-11.
54. Holmes, Codification and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REv. 1 (1870).
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the law unfolds in the more or less unconscious decisions of judges
in particular cases, representing common sense, and whatever generalizations are to be derived from the law must be inductions from
these specific instances. To the attempt to anticipate the growing
process by handing down codes to deal with future cases, Carter
retorted that with respect to future cases both unwritten and written
law are equally uncertain, since neither has the specific instance
before it; but the written law, being committed to a specific formulation beforehand, will be rigid and unable to adjust itself to the
new, while the unwritten law, being committed only to the cases
which have already arisen, is free to respond constructively to the
new situation.
It can scarcely be too often repeated that the office of
private law consists in applying the social standard of
justice to known facts, and that in respect to future transactions, there is, in human apprehension, no such thing as
law, except the broad injunction that justice be done.55
Typically, Carter overstated his case, and had resort even to
the notion, already considered an antique in his day, that the judge
does not make law but only declares it. 56 Even as Holmes more
judiciously formulated it, however, it can be regarded as a hollow
argument, emptied of practical significance by the realization that
the "unwritten law" simply does not function in the way described.
Judges do overgeneralize, and even when presented with actual
cases consider themselves bound in the face of justice by their
own and other judges' prior overgeneralizations. Statutes, on the
other hand, properly formulated, are not rigid but can leave room
for the imagination of the judge in the particular situation, and in
any case be amended if they prove inadequate. The point was made
repeatedly by Field, though without resounding success.
Somewhat more practical reasons were put forward to serve
the general argument against codification. To a considerable extent,
these arguments responded to points made by the codifiers. To
Bentham's distrust of the judges as lawmakers, the answer was
that legislatures, especially democratically elected, non-expert ones
such as were found in most American states, were even worse.
California's legislature was shown to have indulged in an orgy of
amendment and external but related statute-making in the decade
or so of the life of their Civil Code, 57 while the New York legislature
was said to have made continuous and voluminous petty and gross
amendments to the Revised Statutes of 1828.58 In other words,
55. The Provinces of the Written and the Unwritten Law, supra note 63 at 17.
56. Id. at 21.
57. See in Particular the remarks before the New York legislature's joint Judiciary
Committee in 1886, reprinted in 2 COLUMBIA JURIST 327, 330.
58. Id.
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whatever the capacities of the ideal legislator, the real ones would
do more damage to the best purposes of codification than would no
legislation at all. Further, it was argued, those countries in which
codification was more or less successfully undertaken, notably
France and (in process) Germany and Switzerland, the purpose of
the undertaking was not to substitute statutory for judge-made law,
but to unify the law in nations newly formed out of disparate political
and legal systems. 59 Whatever might be the situation in the United
States as a whole, no such need showed itself in New York. Further,
if codification is seen as a remedy for the unreliability and unpredictability (or, on the other hand, the rigidity) of judges, a code of
general principles would leave as much to the judge in the way of
interpretation as the "unwritten law" - there would be as much
case law as before with the same defects.6 0
What might be characterized as the last healthy breath of the
codification movement in New York in its purest form took place
at the ninth annual meeting of the American Bar Association, in
1886, when its Committee on Delays and Uncertainty in Judicial
Administration, chaired by David Dudley Field, introduced the
following resolution:
The law itself should be reduced, so far as possible, to
the form of a statute.
The debate which ensued took two days of the meeting and encompassed sixty-three pages of print in Volume nine of the American
Bar Association Reports. It resulted in the adoption of the following
resolution, by a vote of fifty-eight to forty-one:
The law itself should be reduced, so far as its substantive
principles are settled, to the form of a statute.
New Yorkers Field and John Dillon took the lead in proposing
the resolution, and were accused of (and admitted) wanting eventually to commit the American Bar Association to codification as
such, although the merits of the New York Code were from time
to time said to be outside the proper scope of discussion. All of
the old arguments pro and con were presented, and the closeness
of the vote suggests why no further attempt was made to push the
American Bar Association toward taking up the cudgels for the
Code. The codification movement then retrenched and institutionalized itself with respect to statute law in the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (first convened in 1891
on the invitation of the 1890 New York legislature) and eventually
59.
60.

Remarks of Munroe Smith, id. at 333.
Id.
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with respect to the common law in the American Law Institute
(formed in 1925).
The action now was in the states and territories which had
adopted the Code, to provide some empirical evidence for the
argument.
THE CODE IN CALIFORNIA8 '
Due largely to the efforts of David Dudley Field's brother,
Stephen, California had adopted the Field Code of Civil Procedure
in 1851. Agitation for a codification of the substantive law continued
until a commission was set up in 1868 by the legislature "to revise
and compile the laws of the state into a comprehensive and concise
system. '6 2 For want of time, this commission failed, but it did
make recommendations including one calling for "the codification,
or the reduction 'into a written and systematic code for the whole
body of the law of this state,' as had already been done in the
State of New York, by the creation of a Civil, a political and
criminal code. ' ' G3 The legislature responded by creating a new commission in' 1870, but did not give it authority to codify the common
law. Nonetheless, the commission, whose life was eventually extended to 1874, proceeded to do just that, and adapted the New York
Civil Code to that purpose."4 Its first product was adopted in 1872.
The chief alterations made by the California Commissioners on
the 1865 draft involved incorporation and revision of existing statute
law into the framework of the Code. Perhaps the most important
of the areas thus affected was that of Corporations, which the Commission also quite properly relocated (conforming to Kent and
Blackstone) in the Division on Persons rather than that on Property.
The law of corporations was one of the weakest in the New York
Code, in the sense that only the most general regulations were
included. The trend in the law of that day, which still shows itself
toward separate regulation of corporations engaged in various types
of enterprises - road, transportation, mining, building, banking,
insurance, etc. - was totally unrecognized in the draft, while the
California Code followed the trend fully. 65 The draft dealt almost
exclusively with the process of formation of corporations and with
the handling of shares and memberships, and had little to do with
61.

An extended discussion of the California Civil Code is contained in Professor van
CODE Vol. 6 at 1-41 (West
1954). Much of what follows is based on this article with a few points of differing interpretation and approach.
62. Kleps, The Revision and Codification of California Statues 1849-1953, 42 CAL. L.
REv. 766, 770 (1954).
63. Id. at 771.
64. I. at 778.
66. No less than 16 chapters were devoted to special-purpose corporations, following
one chapter on corporations in general.

Alstyne's "Commentary", printed as a prologue in CAL. CIVIL
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the internal operation of corporations as institutions, while the California provisions emphasized the latter function.
Another area in which indigenous law replaced provisions of
the New York draft was that of marital property, where California's
Spanish civilian heritage dictated the adoption of the principle of
community property. Other areas such as wills and succession,
apprenticeship, homestead, and fraudulent conveyances were Californized with less significant departures from the substance of
the draft provisions. Further, of course, existing California law on
specific points too numerous to mention was given precedence in
the areas of which the bulk of the provisions were taken from the
New York draft.
Apparently with some deliberation, the life of the Commission
extended over two years beyond adoption of the first Code in 1872,
an advisory group headed by Stephen Field was asked to examine
it, and an extensive revision was proposed and adopted in 1874.
Most of the new changes were editorial in nature, although a few,
such as that which removed the exclusive list of permissible purposes of incorporation and substituted a provision permitfing incorporation for any purpose for which men might associate with one
another, were of considerable significance. 66 One sweeping change,
the repeal of the entire chapter on powers, was explained by the
Commissioners rather cryptically:
We have proposed to strike out the whole Chapter on
Powers, as wholly unsuited both to the wants and habits

of the people.

67

It should not astonish anyone that public acceptance of the
Code in California was not whole-hearted and universal. Indeed,
one of the strongest advocates of codification on the original commission of 1870, Charles Lindley, resigned before the report to the
1872 legislature, on the ground that the codes were not complete
and that they had not had a sufficiently careful examination and
discussion aimed at perfecting the system and the detailed provisions. He was not much less dissatisfied with the results of the
1874 revision. 68
One published attack which carried with it some of the socioeconomic flavor of the New York City Bar Association's criticisms,
took the form of a largely fictitious news story concerning a case
said to have aroused
a universal feeling that the Civil Code should at once be
66.
67.
68.

§ 286.
vAN ALsTYN, aupra note 61 at 18.
See Meps, supra note 62 at 773-74 and 778.
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repealed and the other codes
commission to revise them. 69

referred

to a competent

The case was alleged to involve upon polygamy sanctioned by the
rigidities of codified law. A man thought to have lost his first wife
in a Maori attack on their New Zealand village, moved to California
believing her dead and eight years after the attack, married
another woman. The first wife then appeared with children and
moved in with the husband and second wife. The indignant community prosecuted the husband for adultery, but was frustrated by
the fact that the first marriage was valid and the second, due to
70
the five-years'-absence provision of section 61 (2) of the Civil Code,
was also not void. A second prosecution, this time for bigamy, also
foundered on the legitimacy of both marriages. The community
then sought to have the second marriage annulled, only to be
thwarted by the provisions of section 83, which required an action
for annulment to be brought either by one of the parties to the
marriage or by the former spouse whose marriage is still valid;
and a petition for a legislative divorce ran aground on a constitutional provision. The parties were thus enabled to flout one of
nature's (or the community's) most sacred laws with full sanction
of the Civil Code.
The incident was presented by the article's source as an instance
in which the Code had disastrously changed the law, although
the Commissioners had been careful to conform the Code as near
as possible to the existing California law. The latter, with the
common law, in this instance would have held the second marriage
not merely annullable but void.
A New York lawyer, one who was in fact no particular friend
of codification, took note of the Albany Law Journal's account of
this story and pointed out that the provision, indeed copied from
the New York Code, was faithful to the law of New York, which
had overturned the traditional common-law rule with its first Revision
of the Statutes in 1830. 71 The case, however fictitious, thus points
up a problem which was exacerbated when the Code was adopted
in a jurisdiction other than that for which it was drafted, and for
which indeed the Code itself tries rather unsuccessfully to provide
69. The story appeared in the Los Angeles Express, and is reviewed in 9 ALBANY L. J.
5 (1874).
70. § 61: A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the life of a former
husband or wife of such person, with any person other than such former husband or wife,
is illegal and void from the beginning, unless:
2. Unless such former husband or wife was absent, and not known to such
person to be living for the space of five successive years immediately preceding
such subsequent marriage, or was generally reputed and was believed by such person to be dead at the time such subsequent marriage was contracted; in either of
which cases the subsequent marriage is valid until its nullity is adjudged by a competent tribunal.
71. Letter from Mr. Austin Abbott, 9 ALBwy L. J. 25 (1874).
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a solution: namely, the relationship between the Code and the
prior law, as a problem of interpretation.
As drafted for New York, the Code listed the "common law"
as one of the sources of law, manifested in the decisions of the
tribunals. In three provisions, however, it made a strong suggestion
of intention to have the Code supersede the common law in the
broadest sense:
All statutes, laws and rules heretofore in force in this state,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Code, or repeated
or re-enacted herein, are hereby repealed or abrogated;
[Field, Civil Code of New York, §2033 (1865)].
The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law
are to be strictly construed has no application to this
Code. [Field, Civil Code of New York. §2032 (1865)].
In this state there is no common law in any case where
the law is declared by the five Codes. [Field, Civil Code of
New York. §6 (1865)].
In the introduction to the draft, however, Field was at some pains
to point out that the Code would leave the common law (or other
statutes) intact insofar as not inconsistent with it, and the California
Commissioners picked up this cue by adding the following provision:
The provisions of this code, so far as they are substantially the same as existing statutes or the common law,
must be construed as continuations thereof, and not as
new enactments. [Pomeroy, Codes of California Annotated §5 (1901)].
Thus in California, at any rate, the notion that the Code was
in the first instance a codification of the common law was strengthened by requiring rules derived from the common law to be interpreted in the light thereof. On the other hand, the Commission
(again picking up a suggestion in Field's introduction) also reinforced the abrogation of the strict-construction rule by adding the
following sentence to that section:
The code established the law of this state respecting the
subjects to which it relates, and its provisions and all
proceedings under it are to be liberally construed, with
a view to effect its objects and to promote justice. [Pomeroy, Codes of California Annotated §4 (1901)].
This can be read in conjunction with the no-common-law provision
as requiring the interpretation of a given section as repealing by
omission related rules which are not inconsistent with those included.
Cases which made such problems of interpretation concrete are
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not frequent. In McLean v. Blue Point Gravel Co., 7 2 an 1876 case,
however, the California Supreme Court was faced with interpretation of the Code's formulation of the fellow-servant rule:
An employer is not bound to indemnify his employee for
losses suffered by the latter in consequence of the ordinary risks of the business in which he is employed, nor
in consequence of the negligence of another person employed by the same employer in the same general business,
unless he has neglected to use ordinary care in the selection of the culpable employee. [Pomeroy, Codes of California Annotated §1970 (1901)].
There was respectable, if not unanimous precedent in other jurisdictions for the proposition that the fellow-servant rule did not
apply where the culpable employee was in a position of authroity
over the victim (e.g., where the victim was a crewman and the
tortfeasor a foreman). The Supreme Court held, however, that
the Code provision precluded the application of that exception, since
it did not mention any such distinction among "persons employed
by the same employer in the same general business." It need hardly
be said that a contrary interpretation would have been feasible, if
it had been desired, but for the notion that the Code had to be
interpreted literally.
Perhaps with such instances in mind, a broad attack on the
Code and on the role of the courts in interpreting it was launched
in 1884 by the dean of the law school at Berkeley, John Norton
Pomeroy. This attack, which can be said to be the most significant
single event in the history of the Code in California, was contained
in a series of articles in the West Coast Reporter," of which
Pomeroy was then editor. In them he assaulted vigorously all of
the defects of the Code which have been mentioned in connection
with the New York controversy: its disregard for established terminology, its incompleteness, its strangeness of organization, and
above all its inaccuracy. His articles carried the title "True Method
of Interpreting the Civil Code," and the purpose of his criticism
was to establish a uniform method of interpreting the Code, namely
by reading it as completely as possible as if it did not change
a thing.
As a result, no doubt, of having the ulterior purpose of establishing a uniform method of interpretation for the Code, Pomeroy
tended greatly to overstate his case, spending considerable time,
for example, in pointing out provisions of the Code which would
have to be interpreted by the courts, a need which only the Code's
72. 51 Cal. 255 (1876).
73. 8 West Coast Rep. 583, 657, 691, 717 (1883); 4 West Coast Rep. 1, 49, 109, 145
(1884).
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opponents supposed was intended to be obviated.74 At some points,
further, it is interesting to note that the defects he finds were introduced by the California commission where the New York draft was
not "defective." For example, the first of his targets"5 involved
a change by the California Commissioners of section 575 of the
New York draft, which read as follows:
Whenever any real or personal property is disposed of by
will to a descendant or a brother or sister of the testator,
and such legatee or devisee dies during the lifetime of the
testator, leaving a successor who survived the testator,
such disposition does not lapse, but the thing so disposed
of vests in the surviving successors of the legatee or devisee, as if such legatee or devisee had survived the testator and had died intestate.
The California version, section 1310, in the same context, read as
follows:
When any estate is devised to any child, or other relation
of the testator, and the devisee dies before the testator,
leaving lineal descendants, such descendants take the estate so given by the will, in the same manner as the devisee would have done had he survived the testator.
Pomeroy's criticism here was that where in other sections the term
"devise" is used as relating only to real estate, here it is used in
the context of a rule (the anti-lapse statute) which in its common
law scope applied equally to real and personal property, and the
result must be either to interpret the section literally (unthinkable
in substance), or to interpret it as intending the common law scope
(untidy in form). Of course, the meaning of the section, so long
as the term "devise" is understood in its traditional sense, is clear,
and there is no evidence as to the purpose of the distinction:
. . . yet it is almost impossible to conceive that the authors of the code intended to have the common law rules
in full operation in all instances of lapsed legacies, and
76
to change them only in some instances of lapsed devises.
As in the case of Carter, much of Pomeroy's criticism depends
upon the assumption that the present law is clear while the Code
is unclear and will require interpretation. There appears to be
merit, however, in some points of complaint, in particular those
concerning the adoption of novel terminology. For example, Pomeroy
points out that while in the common law of agency the key dis74. E.g., his criticism of j 1310, 3 West Coast Rep. 583, 590-91 (1883),
the term "legal heirs" might leave room for interpretation.
75. Id. at 588-90.
76. Id. at 590.

which is that
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Unction across which agencies are classified is that between
"express" and "implied" agencies, the Code changes to a distinction
between "actual" and "ostensible," which may or may not be the
same one. Similarly, endorsements "in blank" and "in full" are
dropped, and the distinction between "general" and "special" is
introduced into the law of bills and notes; "express" and "implied"
trust are abandoned, and "voluntary" and "involuntary" are introduced - all admittedly with no necessary change in the law, but,
as Pomeroy saw it, also with no necessary improvement in the
law from any point of view.
Pomeroy also saw as a defect what was mentioned above a
a probable attempt to reach the layman, namely, the condensed and
simple style of drafting the provisions. It may seem at this distance
a little strange that he should criticize this aspect of the Code, just
after claiming that the Code did not make any effort to achieve
the simple directness of the French code civil; but he explained
his objection in the following fashion:
One necessary consequence of the extreme conciseness
and brevity is, that matters of the greatest importance are
constantly left as inferences, and often as doubtful inferences, which might much better have been expressed in
the text as additional rules. Even if the court suceeds in
drawing the correct inference, and thus determining the
true rule, the necessity for such work of judicial interpretation might readily have been obviated by incorporating
the inference in the text as a separate rule. In many
cases, the court will have great difficulty in drawing the correct inference as intended by the legislature,
and may sometimes reach a wrong conclusion. All this
element of doubt, uncertainty and possible or even probable
error might have been completely removed by making the
provisions of the code fuller, more detailed, explicit and
explanatory.7
Further, Pomeroy suggested, the avowed purpose of permitting
the layman to know the law is frustrated by the omission of
detailed rules, since these must then only be known by the experts
out of whose hands the law was sought to be delivered. Here again
it might be pointed out, from the vantage point of eighty years'
movement in the law, that the notion that there is always a correct
and an incorrect view of the law applicable to a particular situation,
and the concomitant view that the law is made up not of principles
but of rules, is one which was much more current then than it is
now and we would be inclined to think Pomeroy's criticisms more
nearly one hundred and eighty degrees off the mark in this respect.
77.

Id. at 718.
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If anything, we should be more inclined to say that the goal of
reducing the law to principles is wrong, not because lawyers
know better, but because laymen think otherwise, think rather that
the law is a collection of rules, and would therefore be unable to
be enlightened by principles. In any case, the criticism serves to
emphasize Pomeroy's main point, that interpretation and supplementation of the Code were 'not only inevitable but necessary.
Pomeroy's conclusion was that because interpretation was necessary, a consistent and uniform method of interpretation should
be developed. Otherwise, he argued, no lawyer would be able to
advise his client as to the state of the law on the point before him,
and the citizen would be unable to know what his situation would
be. Since the issue is the relationship between the Code and prior
law (which was complete and harmonious and intelligible), there
were two systems, either to consider the common law wholly abrogated, or to consider it as little abrogated as the language of the
Code would permit. Pomeroy chose the latter:
On the other hand, the court might regard the code as
primarily and mainly a declaration and enactment of common law rules. They might interpret every provision as
intended to be a mere statement of the common law doctrine unchanged, with all its consequences, unless from the
unequivocal language of that provision, a clear and certain
intent appeared to alter the common law rule. They might
construe all new, hitherto unused, and ambiguous phraseology, as not designed to work a change in the pre-existing settled rules, unless the intent to work such a change
was clear and unmistakable. This, I submit, is the principle of interpretation which the courts should
adopt and
78
apply without any deviation to the civil code.

That is to say, the strict construction rule should be restored.
Within a year of the publication of these articles, the California
Supreme Court was faced with a problem which called for at least
some application of this method, where it was necessary to determine what law applies to the distribution of a decedent's personal
estate - the law of the situs of the property, or the law of the
decedent's domicile at time of death. In Estate of Apple, 79 the
court held that there was no provision in the Code regulating this
subject, and that therefore the common law rule would apply, making
the law of the domicile controlling. The court acknowledged, however, that had there been a provision in the area, it would have
been necessary to construe it liberally, pursuant to section 4 of
the Code, in order to effectuate its purposes. Presumably, therefore,
78.
79.

4 West Coast Rep. 52 (1884).
5 West Coast Rep. 518 (1885).

UNCELEBRATED CENTENNIAL

the Court was not yet prepared to adopt Pomeroy's position that
section 4 should be read out of the Code.
Pomeroy's articles were first noticed expressly by the California
Supreme Court in 1888, in the famous case of Sharon v. Sharon.80
The case involved an action for divorce in which the defense was
that there was no valid marriage. The parties had signed a declaration of marriage and had cohabited at least occasionally, but
maintained separate homes and expressly agreed to keep the marriage a secret. After a year the husband threw the wife out and
refused to support her further. The issue in the case was whether
a valid marriage required publicity under California Civil Code
section 55 (taken with some modification from New York draft
section 34):
Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract, to which the consent of parties capable of making
it is necessary. Consent alone will not constitute marriage; it must be followed by a solemnization, or by a mutual assumption of marital rights, duties, or obligations.
Where the New York draft had made consent alone sufficient,
the California draftsmen had added the requirement of solemnization. Pomeroy had made this provision the object of express
criticism (mentioning its involvement in the then pending Sharon
case), precisely on the ground that it did not deal with the secret
marriage.8 ' The general requirement of solemnization was already
an addition to the common law, unless the phrase "mutual assumption of marital rights, duties or obligations" could be read
as equivalent to "copulation," which was the common law requirement where there was no solemnization. Pomeroy was of the opinion
that unless the provision could be read as a simple rephrasing of
the common law requirement, the only available innovation was
the requirement of publicity, which he thought inappropriate, where
its function under the common law cases was merely as evidence,
of which there could be other, of the fact of copulation. The court
discussed Pomeroy's argument and California cases on which it
was based, and reached the conclusion that the section was not
intended to establish a requirement of publicity, but only a living
together as husband and wife, and that the secret agreement
followed by copulation was sufficient. The court adopted some of
the language of Pomeroy's proposed method of interpretation:
The common law underlies all our legislation and furnishes
the rule of decision, except insofar as the statutes have
changed the common law. When the common law is de80.
81.

76 Cal. 1, 16 P. 845 (1888).
4 West Coast Rep. 60-51 n. 2.
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parted from by a provision of the Code, effect is to be
given to the provision to the extent, and only to the extent,
of the departure. This is not saying that the Code must
be strictly construed, as those terms were sometimes applied to classes of statutes prior to the Codes. Every provision of the Code, expressed in intelligible language, must
be given full force and effect. But, under pretense of interpretation - or explanation in different language - the
courts cannot add to the significant terms of a statute;
nor, by resorting to conjecture, can they go beyond the intent derivable from the terms
actually employed, consider82
ed with the pre-existing law.
In a subsequent opinion,88 the court reconsidered its conclusion
that the facts satisfied the requirements of section 55, without
changing the basic understanding of what was required. It was
concluded that because the parties maintained all the outward semblance of separate lives, and did not live together as husband and
wife in any sense other than occasional copulation, that there had
not been a mutual assumption of marital rights and duties. While
this conclusion did not constitute a decision that publicity was in
fact required, it did suggest that lack of publicity may be fatal
if the efforts to avoid detection involve refraining from assuming
the full marital life.
If it be thought that Pomeroy's proposed method of interpretation and its apparent adoption by the California courts
destroyed the Code's effectiveness as a codification of the common
law, it is perhaps important to consider what is at stake. It is
clearly a repudiation of the Code to hold that the Code is a statute
to be strictly construed; it is quite another thing merely to say
that it is to be interpreted in the light of the common law, and
that ambiguities or gaps are to be resolved or filled by reference
to the common law. It would seem that the one way the Code
would be rendered ineffective as a codification of the common law
would be to establish the principle that as to any problem in the
private law, the court should look first to the common law, and
having determined precisely how it would be answered according
to that prior law, then look to the Code to see if any change has
been made. Then the Code would not have effectively replaced any
of the formal sources of law previously relied upon, but would
only be used as a statute in the traditional sense, that is, as a means
of changing the law in certain particulars. If, on the other hand,
the Code is looked to first, and the common law consulted only
where the meaning of the Code is not clear, it would be performing
82.
83.

16 P. 345, 357.
Sharon v. Sharon, 79 CaL 633, 22 P. 26 (1889).
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its office as well as its draftsmen have fitted it to do. It seems to me
that the approach taken by the California court in the Sharon case
was the latter rather than the former, and that if Pomeroy intended,
as he seems to have, that the former approach be taken, he did
not succeed in persuading the court.
Other aspects of the relationship between the Code and the
common law have been explored by the California courts. The
literal significance of section 5, requiring provisions substantially
similar to the common law to be construed as continuations of
that law, was manifested in Churchill v. Pacific Implement Co.,8"
in which the liability of an innkeeper as bailee under section 1859
was sought to be enforced. The defense was the statute of limitations, which had not run on liability created by statute but had
run on liability arising out of an obligation. The court held that
the liability was essentially similar to that of an innkeeper at
common law, and was therefore not created by the Code, and that
the statute of limitations on obligations generally therefore applied.
Another interesting problem of continuity was presented in
Kennedy v. Burnap,8 5 where the easement of ancient lights was
at issue. Under the English common law, a reserved easement of
light and air was implied in any grant of vacant land adjacent to
a house, such that the new owner could not build buildings on the
vacant land which would interfere with the enjoyment of light and
air by the house. The American common law never adopted this
view, or at least most jurisdictions didn't, and the California Code
said nothing on the subject except to say that light and air could
become the subject of an easement, and that all easements are
passed with title unless otherwise expressly stated. There was apparently no prior California law on the subject. The court held,
without discussing the matter in great detail, that the common
law was not abrogated by the Code, and that the gap could be
filled by the essentially common law process of choosing the preferable rule, which the court found to be the American one. It is
not clear, however, since the court refers to the English rule as
the common law rule, whether it was applying section 5 of the
Code or section 4.
Finally, Siminoff v. Jas. H. Goodman & Co. Bank,8 6 a 1912
decision, illustrates the sort of detailed examination of provisions
of the Code in their context that can precede a holding that the
common law rule is still applicable. This was an action against a
bank for wrongfully dishonoring plaintiff's checks when presented
84. 96 Cal. 490, 81 P. 560 (1892).
85. 120 Cal. 488, 52 P. 843 (1898).
86. 18 C&L App. 5, 121 P. 989 (1912).
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by his payees when there were sufficient funds in his account to
pay them. A major element in the plaintiff's assignment of damages
was loss of business reputation. The defendant argued that section
3302 of the Code applied, precluding a claim for loss of reputation:
The detriment caused by the breach of an obligation to
pay money only is deemed to be the amount due by the
terms of the obligation, with interest thereon.
The court noted that this section was preceded by a general contract
provision, section 3300:
For the breach of an obligation arising from contract,
the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly
provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate
the party aggrieved for all the detriment caused thereby,
or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely
to result therefrom.
and that it is immediately succeeded by a provision relating to
torts:
For the breach of an obligation not rising from contract,
the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly
provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby,
whether it could have been anticipated or not.
The court concluded that the provision relating to obligations
to pay money only did not apply, both because the relationship
between banker and customer is something more than merely
debtor-creditor (although the obligation with respect to the checks
is clearly only to pay money) and because the Code could not have
intended to deprive 'the customer of what was his common law
right to substantial damages in such a situation. Since the Code
was therefore silent, the common law rule applied. It is not clear
why the holding should not have been that the general contract
provision applied, rather than the common law rule as such, but
the result, and the intense searching for meaning and rationale in
the Code before looking to the common law, are significant.
Of the legislative treatment of the Code, which is chronicled
in rich detail by Professor van Alstyne in his commentary on the
California Civil Code, 7 probably the most significant events are
the gradual removal, largely in the extensive revisions undertaken
in the 1930's and 1940's, of substantial portions of the Code for
separate handling. The largest single area was that of Corporations
(Corporations Code), nearly equalled by the law of Wills and Succession, and Guardianship (Probate Code), Insurance (Insurance
87.

Bupra note 61.
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Code), much of Master and Servant and Apprenticeship (Labor
Code), and Shipping, Maritime Liens and Maritime Personnel
(Harbors and Navigation Code). The chief effect of these removals
was on the unity of the Code and on its image as something more
than a mere statute to be revised and juggled according to convenience.
THE CODE IN THE DAKOTAS
The Territory. The New York Code was adopted almost verbatim
by the 1865 session of the Dakota territorial legislature, apparently
at the instance of the members of the territorial Supreme Court.""
No evidence has been found to indicate why the members of the
Supreme Court were interested in the Code or how they came
to be in possession of the draft. All three - Jefferson P. Kidder,
Ara Bartlett (chief) and William E. Gleason - were natives of
other areas and received their law training elsewhere, as could
be expected in so young a territory. In all probability, the fact that
it came from New York, whence came the already widespread
Code of Civil Procedure, and that it constituted a handy statement
of the law in more or less instant form for a virtually unlawyerized
territory, sufficed to ensure its adoption once its existence and
contents became known.
The first notable thing that happened to the Code in Dakota
after its adoption was its thorough-going revision in 1875-77. This
revision was undertaken by a Commission composed of Chief
Justice Peter Shannon, associate justice Granville Bennett, and the
prominent attorney Bartlett Tripp, with a non-lawyer as secretary,
W. H. H. Beadle. Beadle tells of the experience in personal terms
in his memoirs, 9 mentioning scarcely a single detail about the
contents of the Civil Code. The genealogical hint he gives is that
the California code was utilized along with the New York as model:
The legislature had shown a preference for the New York
codes. California had them in more complete form, modified to suit their tribunals and civil system. We had the
report of the New York (Field) code commission upon the
entire subject. There was much study and discussion toward a clear understanding of the whole subject, and upon
some points, such as corporations, some differences, but
all sessions and all final action were harmonious . ...
Thus, from the former incomplete code of Dakota, from
the Field report in New York, California code and original
work, grew the full civil code. . . . Judge Shannon had
nearly full charge of the civil code ....
90
88. I KMuaBRUoY, DAIXOTA TaRnR~oY, 429-430 (1915).
89. 3 SOUTH DAKOarA HiSTORICAL COLLECTiONS 85, 129 (1906).
90. d. at 131-32.
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The result in 1877 was by no means a slavish copy of the
California code, but in most particulars substantially identical. Both
retained virtually all the peculiar features of the Field draft, its
organization and classification, its strong civil law influence, its
tendency to adopt new terminology, etc. Dakota did not follow
California into community property, and it frequently omitted
changes made in other areas of the law, but it did accept the
approach and to a considerable extent the details, for example,
of the California provisions on corporations, while retaining and
incorporating existing territorial legislation.
Unlike the California codifiers, Dakota did not attempt to change
the draft provisions concerning the relationship between the Code
and the common law. This left the reconciliation of what might
seem to be inconsistent commands to the courts. Since the first
reported decision of the territorial Supreme Court was handed down
in 1867, its sixth year of existence, and since only a half-dozen
had been reported by 1875, when the revision commission was
already at work, it perhaps should not surprise anyone that the
first opinions dealing with this problem of interpretation were
written after the 1877 revision and by the chief architect thereof,
Chief Justice Shannon.
Wambole v. Foote, 2 Dak. 1 (1878), was an action to cancel
three deeds and set aside a tax deed on the ground that the plaintiff
transferor was a minor at the time of the conveyances and at the
'time of execution by her of a power of attorney to sell, and that
the deeds and power were therefore void. The power was executed
in 1862, before adoption of the Civil Code, but the first conveyance
was not executed by the attorney in fact until January 24, 1866,
after the effective date of the Code. The common law was to the
effect that a contract of conveyance by a minor was void unless
the conveyance took effect by manual delivery by the minor, in
which case the conveyance was only voidable. Since a power was
not a conveyance of interest, the execution thereof was not a conveyance taking effect by the transferor's manual delivery, and
it was therefore void. The Code provision stated simply, "A minor
cannot give a delegation of power" (section 15), without attempting
to deal with the distinction between void and voidable transfers.
Justice Shannon found that the Code provision was declaratory of
the common law rule (the New York commissioners' notes specifically referred to absolute voidness) and should therefore be
understood as rendering such a power absolutely void. A second
problem in the case was the fact that between the giving of the
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power and its execution, the plaintiff married; at common law this
would have voided the power, since it was not coupled with an
interest, and while the Code said nothing on this specific issue it
did require that a conveyance by a married woman would be effective only if acknowledged directly by private examination as
prescribed by statute. This was said by Shannon to have been taken
via the New York Revised Statutes of 1828, and an extensive
analysis of the New York Code from the cases interpreting this
provision was undertaken to show that the acknowledgement by
the plaintiff of the deeds in question was insufficient. Shannon's
justification for this excursion shows a healthy respect for the
historical background of the Code which is difficult to distinguish
from the rule of interpretation in the light of the common law:
In thus tracing the origin and in giving the contemporaneous exposition of these statutes incorporated into our
Code, this opinion has become somewhat lengthy. The
cause of this, however, is that a thorough and complete
understanding of them is essential in this, the first case in
this Territory calling for their interpretation. It is not
that there is any ambiguity in the language, but that a
clearer light is shed from the history of statute, and from
opinions in respect to it entertained by jurists at the time
of its passage ....
91
Everett v. Buchanan, 2 Dak. 249 (1880), was an action to recover
property wrongfully taken from the plaintiff's possession on the
basis of a chattel mortgate with power of sale, and sold to the
defendant at private sale. Plaintiff was lessee under a lease executed after the chattel mortgage. The Code, incorporating by
reference the provisions on pledge, required sale under a chattel
mortgage to be made by public auction (section 1743), and provided
that wrongful conversion by the holder of the lien would extinguish
it (section 1718). The plaintiff claimed that the improper sale constituted a wrongful conversion, and that therefore the lien was
extinguished and the plaintiff entitled to recovery of possession.
The majority opinion by Judge Kidder, without any discussion of
the sources to be consulted in interpreting section 1718, cited a
New York case for the plaintiff's proposition and held in his favor.
Shannon's concurring opinion launched into an extensive discussion of the common law of mortgages and how the provisions
of the Code relate thereto. He pointed out (as did Field in his
notes to the draft) that the common law, and Kent and Story with
it, adopted the title theory of mortgage - that they constituted a
conveyance on condition with an equitable right of redemption 91.

2 Dak. at 18.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

and that in New York and California, prior to the Code, only the
mortgage of realty had come to be considered a lien, while the
chattel mortgage had retained its character of a conveyance upon
condition. The Code, however, as drafted for New York and adopted
in both Dakota and California, took the final step, making all mortgages liens (section 1608 of the draft, section 1722 of the Dakota
Code) and expressly denying that a lien passed any title to the
property (section 1591 draft, section 1706 Dakota Code) it was observed with Story, that the lien theory of mortgages is a generalization of the civil law notion of hypothecation, which is subjection
of property to the payment of a debt, conditionally, without
transfer of possession. While a chattel mortgage (unlike a real
mortgage) could be foreclosed without legal proceedings, and the
mortgagee might take possession preliminary to such extrajudicial
foreclosure, the mortgagee's right remained a lien only and the
mortgagor retained title until the actual sale. Prior to the Code,
at common law, the power to sell was not limited to public auction,
unless the instrument creating the mortgage made it so; but the
Code made public auction a requirement, and Shannon pointed
out that the Code did not innovate altogether in making a wrongful
conversion extinguish the lien. In any case, however,
. . .these and other decisions have here given place to positive enactments. They are no longer the sole guides; for
when the Code speaks, the common law vanishes. They
may furnish the reasons for
the law, and aid in its interpre92
tation, but nothing more.
In other words, the Code must be understood and interpreted in
the light of the existing law at the time of its formulation, but
its terms are nonetheless controlling.
A more common-law-oriented opinion was handed down by
Justice Hudson in Herbert V. Northern Pacific R.R. Co., 3 Dak.
38 (1882). There the action was for personal injuries suffered by a
railroad brakeman when he attempted to stop two cars in a yard
pursuant to order of the yard-master. The immediate cause of the
accident was defective brakes on both cars. The defendant claimed
that the yard-master was negligent and the fellow-servant rule
applied, the railroad thus being exonerated from liability. The
opinion begins with an exposition of the common law relating to
the fellow-servant rule, including the exception for concurrent negligence of the master, and then notes that the defendant claimed,
in effect, that the Code provision on the fellow-servant rule
92.
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eliminated the exceptions by omission. 9 The court concluded that
the section in question, when read in conjunction with the following
section establishing the master's liability for his own negligence,94
was not intended to change the common law rule.
But we cannot see that the section of the statute above
quoted [section 1130] has changed in any respect the
rule of law relating to this subject. It has enacted simply
the common law into the statute which cannot give it any
more force than it had before such enactment ...
This section of the statute [section 1131] is in perfect
accord with the decisions which hold that the master is
liable to a servant for his, the master's own negligence,
or want of care and prudence, or for his own personal
occasioning injury and damage to the
act or misconduct,
95
servant.
To the assertion that by stationing a repairman at the yard the
yard master has fulfilled his duty, and that the faulty brakes were
the result of the repairman's negligence, Justice Hudson retorted:
We understand the principle maintained in the cases cited
to be, that there are certain duties which concern the safety of the servant that belong to the master to perform,
and he cannot rid himself of responsibility to his servant
for not performing them by showing that he delegated the
performance to another servant who neglected to follow his
instructions or omitted to do the duty entrusted to him.98
This comes close, at least in appearance, to the approach which
Pomeroy advocated for California two years later, namely, to
consider the first inquiry always to be into the common law and to
consult the Code only to determine if any change is intended. The
same result would no doubt have obtained if the opposite approach
had been used: first to consult the Code and, upon finding that
the Code does not expressly deal with the problem of concurrent
negligence of master and fellow-servant, but does restate the common law as to the fellow-servant rule and the master's liability
separately, then to consult the common law to fill the gap. The
significance of the Code as a legislative act, however, is vastly
different in the two approaches, and if the first was intended by
Judge Hudson ( as is suggested further by his constant references
93. "An employer is not bound to indemnify his employee for loeses suffered by the latter in consequence of the ordinary risks of the business in which he is employed, nor in
consequence of the negligence of another person employed by the same employer in the
same general business, unless he haa neglected to use ordinary care in the selection of
the culpable employee." Rzv. CoDEs, DAK. 1 1130 (1877).
94. "An employer must in all cases indemnify his employee for losses caused by the
former's want of ordinary care." Id. § 1131.
95. 8 Dak. 38, 53-54.
96. Id. at 54 (emphasis supplied).
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to "our statute") it could have been a severe blow to its usefulness.
The opinion contains no exhortation to adopt such a principle of
interpretation, however, and the suggestion by example seems not
to have been overtly taken up in later opinions.
It is interesting, on the other hand, that a somewhat similar treatment was given the Code on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court in the same case, by no less a proponent of codification than
Justice Stephen Field. In his opinion Field, like Hudson, began with
an exposition of the common law, which he found to be clearly
against the railroad, and then looked to the Code for possible alteration of this rule.
If . . . one was appointed by [the master] charged with

that duty [to maintain the equipment in working order],
and the injuries resulted from his negligence in that performance, the company is liable. He was, so far as that
duty is concerned, the representative of the company; his
negligence was its negligence, and imposed a liability upon
it, unless, as contended,
it was relieved therefrom by the
97
statute of Dakota.
Field concluded, again with Hudson, that no change in the common
law rule was intended by section 1130 of the Code, noting that a
Massachusetts case applying the common law rule had held that
providing and maintaining machinery is not "the same general
business" as operating it, and noting also that California had given
the same construction to its identical Code provision. Field did,
however, attempt to explain his position a little further in terms
of the silence of the Code itself:
We do not perceive that the provision of the . . .Civil Code
of Dakota, that . . . 'there is no common law in any case
where the law is declared by the codes', at all affects the
question before us.
There cannot be two rules of law on the same subject
contradicting each other. Therefore, where the code declares the law there can be no occasion to look further;
but where the code is silent the common law prevails.
What constitutes the 'same general business' is not defined
by the code, but may be explained by adjudged cases.
The declaration by the Code of a general rule, which is
conformable to the existing law, does not prevent the courts
from looking to those cases for explanation any more than
it prevents them from looking into the dictionary for the
meaning of words.9
Of course, to say that the common law prevails where the Code
97.
98.

Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 652 (1886)
Id. at 654.
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is silent is quite a different proposition from that which says the
common law prevails unless the Code contradicts it. It would have
been more helpful, however, if Field had begun his opinion by
noting the silence of the Code, rather than adding it as an after
thought.
Justice Hudson met the Code on rather more direct terms in
Wood v. Cuthbertson, 3 Dak. 328 (1884). The action was to recover
'principal and interest on a loan, with a defense of usury and a
counterclaim for the interest paid. The case was seen as a straightforward problem of interpretation of the Code provisions on usury,
the issue being whether the entire interest paid on a usurious loan
was recoverable or only that paid in excess of the legal rate. The
plaintiff invoked an Illinois statute and cases interpreting it, for
the proposition that the entire interest is recoverable, but his
authority was brushed aside:
Section 1100, of our Civil Code, is the same as to the
forfeiture; then adds the provision for the recovery of the
excess of the usurious interest paid over 12 per cent per
annum, differing from the Illinois statue. This, we think
is exclusive of all other remedies. The Code having declared the law as to the recovery of usurious interest there
is no common law right: See Sec. 6, Civil Code. 9 '
Finally, a fairly straightforward application of the no-commonlaw provision is to be found in Garretson v. Purdy, 3 Dak. 178
(1882). There the action was to enforce a promissory note, by a
holder in due course, which contained in addition to the basic
promise to pay a stipulation for attorney's fees in case litigation
became necessary to enforce the note. The issue was whether the
additional stipulation rendered the note non-negotiable and therefore
subject to equitable defenses. After examining the common law and
finding a split of authority on the question, the court back-tracked
and noted that "independent of these conflicting decisions, and
independent of the common law upon this question," the Code had
resolved the issue. The crucial provision found to be controlling
was section 1827: "A negotiable instrument must not contain any
other contract than such as is specified in this article." This, in
conjunction with the no-common-law rule, settled the matter.
No other legislative developments of interest here were made
in the Code during territorial days. It can be seen that the courts
did not develop a consistent pattern of interpretation, at least overtly,
although the overall impression is that the Code was taken seriously
and was given its due, with the common law resorted to only when
the Code was silent or ambiguous.
99.

Dak. at 884.
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South Dakota. At the first session of the South Dakota legislature
following statehood, it was necessary to pass a law continuing in
force the laws of the territorial period. In the context of this act
the legislature also included a provision expressly making the
common law applicable in cases where the positive law was silent.
The phrasing of the statute seems innocent enough:
[Section 1]. All laws, in force in the Territory of Dakota at the date of the admission of the State of South
Dakota into the Union and not repugnant to or inconsistent
with the Constitution of said State, shall continue and be
in full force and effect until altered, amended or repealed.
[Section 2]. In any and all cases not controlled by the
laws enumerated in section 1 hereof the Common Law
shall be the law of this State . . . [Laws 1890, ch. 105]
In the code revision of 1903, however, this provision was translated
into the following rather different proposition:
In this state the common law is in force except where
it conflicts with the codes or the constitution. [Civil Code
Section 6].
It is not clear at all that the 1903 revisers supposed the revised
section 6 to be vastly different from the provision it replaced:
In this territory there is no common law in any case where
the law is declared by the codes [Dakota Civil Code
Section 5].
for the marginal note "Codes exclude common law" was retained
by them. By the 1919 revision, however, which interestingly enough
dropped the designation "Civil Code" and adopted that of "Substantive Provisions," even this hangover from the original Code
was eliminated. Despite this apparent confusion, and the retention
throughout of the original provision as modified by California
abolishing the strict-construction rulle, the end result comes very
close to an adoption by the legislature of the Pomeroy method of
interpretation, of looking first to the common law and then to the
Code.
To my knowledge, the South Dakota Supreme Court has remarked on this amendment only once, and that almost incidentally.
In Moberg v. Scott, 38 S.D. 422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917), the action was
for wrongful death in selling opium in eventually fatal amounts
to plaintiff's husband. The defendant argued that the basis of the
action was injury to personal relation that this was governed by
Code section 32(1) which read: "The rights of personal relation
forbid: 1. The abduction of a husband from his wife, . . ." and
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that this constituted an exclusive list of injuries which did not
include death by narcotic addiction. A number of responses were
available to the court to the defendant's argument. California had
interpreted its identical provisions by holding the word "abduction"
to include interferences short of a physical carrying-off, but the
South Dakota court declined to stretch the words so far. Rather it
held that section 32 was not an exclusive list of rights of personal
relation, and that other sections of the Code supplied authority for
the plaintiff's claim:
[Section 27] . . . . [E]very person has, subject to the
qualifications and restrictions provided by law, the right of
protection from . . . injury to his personal relations.
[Section 1940]. Every person who suffers detriment from
the unlawful act or omission of another, may recover from
the person in fault a compensation therefore in money,
which is called damages.
[Section 2076].

For every wrong there is a remedy.

At this point the opinion looks like an example of the most
imaginative use of the Code to solve problems not expressly dealt
with. The court went on, however, to state that the common law,
once the disability of coverture had been removed, would recognize a right of action in such a case, and pointed out that while
old section 6 ("there is no common law in any case where the law
is declared by the code") would have afforded ground for arguing
that section 32 is an exclusive list of rights of personal relation,
the 1890 amendment makes the common law applicable in the state.
"For both reasons" the plaintiff's complaint was sustained.
Other cases dealing with interpretation of the Code in South
Dakota fill out a picture similar to that in California, that is, a
mixed bag of utterances each apparently designed more to resolve
the particular conflict before the court than to establish firm
principles of interpretation. In Rudolph v. Herman 4 S.D. 283, 56
N.W. 901 (1893), a mortgagor sued to recover rents and profits
due on property subject to the mortgage. The defense of the tenant
was that the mortgagor had foreclosed and that demand for the
rents and profits during the redemption period had been made by
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. The Civil Code incorporated
by reference provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as governing
the foreclosure proceedings, but the latter provisions did not deal
with the right of the purchaser to rents and profits during the
redemption period. The analogy of an execution sale was available,
however, where the Code of Civil Procedure expressly gave the
purchaser the right to rents and profits during any redemption
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period. Without discussing the applicability of the provision abolishing the strict-construction rule, the court held that the right to
purchase at a mortgage foreclosure sale is a purely statutory one,
and as such to be strictly construed to avoid expanding the liability
of the mortgagor beyond that expressly established. A North Dakota
case interpreting the same provision as giving the purchaser the
right to the rents and profits during the redemption period was
rejected as violating the strict-construction rule. This opinion goes
as far toward reducing the Code to the status of an ordinary common
law statute as any, but it does not appear to have had general
influence.
Hallen v. Martin, 40 S.D. 343, 167 N.W. 324 (1918), was an action
for fraud and deceit in misrepresenting land for which plaintiff
traded his own to defendant. The dispute was over the proper
measure of damages in such a situation, with the competing
formulations being: (1) the difference between the actual value
of the land and the price paid for it, and (2) the difference between
the actual value of the land and the value it would have had had the
representations been accurate. The Code contained no provision
prescribing the measure of damages for deceit in such cases. The
court held that the damages provisions in the Code were declaratory
of the common law, and that it was therefore proper to look to the
law of other jurisdictions to determine the common law and to
interpret the Code in the light thereof. The conclusion was that
the second formulation was the common law rule and was to be
adopted in South Dakota. A concurring opinion pointed out that
the decisions in other jurisdictions were in conflict, even as to the
general measure of damages in tort actions, and that therefore
it was to some extent improper to talk about a common law rule;
dissenting opinions argued in preference for the other view of the
common law. The case thus illustrates the weakness of the Pomeroy
method of interpretation in the face of uncertainty as to what the
common law rule was, and the question remains after such a
decision, whether the South Dakota Code has been interpreted, in
the light of the common law, as making the measure of damages
in deceit actions equivalent to that of breach of warranty of
quality, or whether the common law has been read as requiring
this result.
An interesting example of argument based on the premise
that South Dakota is a common law state is to be found in Truxes
v. Kenco Enterprises, Inc., 119 N.W. 2d 914 (S.D. 1963). The issue
there was the existence of a right of privacy, allegedly violated
by unauthorized publication of the plaintiff's photograph. The defendant argued that the common law adopted in South Dakota was

UNCELEBRATED CENTENNIAL

that in existence as of 1890, the date of adoption, and that in 1890
there was no right of privacy.
The court held, however, that there is no such limitation on the
common law of the State, and that since the right of privacy
is now a part of the common law of other jurisdictions, it is a
part of the law of South Dakota. No attempt was made to find
provisions of the Code which might furnish support for such a right
such as the gneeral tort provision:
Every person has. . .the right of protection from bodily
harm or restraint, from personal insult, from defamation,
and from injury to his personal relations, and every person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring
any such rights of others and to abstain from injuring the
person or property of another. [Section 973 Civil Code].
Thus it can be seen that while the cases are not conclusive,
there is a strong tendency in South Dakota, encouraged by the
almost inadvertent adoption of the common law in 1890-1903, to
relegate the Code to the secondary position of a common law
statute, and to look in the first instance to the case law of other
jurisdictions.
The other significant development in the life of the Code in
South Dakota is also a legislative one. In 1939 all the Codes and
statutes of the State were consolidated into a single Code covering
all subjects in an alphabetically arranged system. The Civil Code
thus lost its identity as a separate system of law, with its provisions
scattered in a conceptually unorganized fashion throughout the new
Code. The importance of this move will be discussed below in
connection with the identical move of North Dakota in 1943.
North Dakota. Unlike South Dakota, North Dakota made no attempt,
at least none prior to 1943, to amend the Code provisions dealing
with the relationship between it and the common law, but left
those provisions substantially as they were in the territorial period.
The chief interest lies, therefore, in the way the courts have handled
the Code.
In Garr, Scott & Co. v. Clements, 4 N.D. 559, 62 N.W. 640 (1895),
the 1890 mechanics' lien law, which gave the mechanics' lien
priority over mortgages and other liens, was challenged as unconstitutional. The only provision relating to mechanics' and artisans'
liens in the Code, section 1814, said nothing about priority. It was
held that the statute was declaratory of the common law with respect to priority, and therefore did not affect existing rights in a
unconstitutional manner.
The 1890 statute was absorbed into the 1895 revision of the
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Code, but without the priority provision, and a new statute was
passed in 1907, again expressing the priority. This statute was attacked on similar grounds in Reeves & Co. v. Russell, 28 N.D. 265, 148
N.W. 654 (1914), and again held constitutional since declaratory
of the common law. It should be noted here that the principle that
statutes declaratory of the common law are to be construed in the
light thereof is a generally recognized one of long standing in the
Anglo-American law.100
The principle that where the Code is silent the common law
applies was invoked in Brignall v. Hannah, 34 N.D. 174, 157 N.W
1042 (1916), where owners of riparian land sued squatters to recover
possession of land uncovered by recession of non-navigable lake
waters. The court found no statutory or constitutional provisions
dealing directly with the problem, although streams and navigable
lakes are dealt with in the Code, and held therefore that the
common law applied to give riparian owners title to the center
of the lake.
The liberality with which Code provisions are to be construed
was the subject of two interesting cases decided in the 1930's by
the North Dakota Supreme Court. In Grabow v. Bergeth, 59 N.D.
214, 229 N.W. 282(1930), plaintiff sued for fraud in the sale of
stock, and the issue was the assignability of a cause of action for
deceit. The key Code provision was section 5446, Compiled Laws of
1913 (section 361 of the Civil Code):
A thing in action, arising out of the violation of a right of
property or out of an obligation, may be transferred by
the owner. Upon the death of the owner it passes to his
personal representatives... (emphasis added).
A cause of action for deceit, as a tort claim, falls under the
general heading in the Code of an obligation imposed by law,
and the question for the court was whether the term "obligation,"
as used in section 361, included "obligation imposed by law." The
court concluded, having in mind the general common law prohibition against assignment of choses in action, that section 361, by
virtue of the insertion of the italicized portion in the position of a
qualifying phrase, was not intended to be a general abolition of the
common law rule, but only a limited one. Since all choses in action
arise either from a violation of a right of property or out of an
obligation in the broad sense (contract or tort), the limitation must
lie in the extent of the term "obligation" as used in the particular
section, and that can only consist in exclusion of causes of
action ex delicto. The court then launched into an extremely com100. See, e.g,, 82 C.J.S. Statutee § 863; CRAWmOD,
(1940); CwRa , STATUTE LAW 104 (1911).
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plex analysis of other provisions in the Code and in other codes or
statutes, to show that the legislature assumed that some types of
things in action were not assignable. First, the Code of Civil
Procedure of 1877 (originally adopted in 1867 after the Civil Code)
contained a provision which read as follows:
Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest. . .; but this section shall not be deemed
to authorize the assignment of a thing in action not arising
out of contract. [Code of Civil Procedure section 74].
Second, the North Dakota Probate Code, despite the provisions of
section 361 of the Civil Code, listed in sections 8798, 8800 and 8801
(Compiled Laws of 1913) all those actions in which the executor
or administrator of a decedent's estate could prosecute or defend
in his representative capacity, and actions for fraud, deceit,
and so-called personal torts are conspicuously absent from the
list, indicating an understanding that such causes of action did
not survive - and since section 361 uses assignability and survival
co-extensively, it follows that such actions must not be assignable.
Similarly, certain of the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure
on statutes of limitation imply that personal injury claims do not
survive. The common law prohibition against assignment of choses
in action survived, in that choses in action ex delicto continued
unassignable. A South Dakota precedent construing the identical
provision in their Code otherwise was rejected by the North Dakota
court as having failed to take into account the existence of the
common law rule in the background of the Code provision.
On the other hand, it was noted by the court that though some
states had changed the common law rule, it was always by statute
and not by judicial decision. A strong dissent by Chief Justice
Burke emphasized that the language of the civil procedure provision was stricken by the legislature in 1895. The net effect of this
case appears therefore to be similar to the adoption of the Pomeroy
method of interpretation, or a strict-construction rule, despite the
emphasis on other statutory language as tending to support the
restrictive interpretation of the Code provision.
A much more sympathetic reading of a similarly ambiguous
provision was given in Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191,
242 N.W. 526 (1932). That was an action by a wife against a husband
for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident, and
the issue was whether the common law disability of coverture had
been abolished. The Code provision coming closest to dealing with
the subject was section 79 (Compiled Laws of 1913, section 4411):
Either husband or wife may enter into any engagement
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or transaction with the other, or with any other person,
respecting property, which the other might, if unmarried.
The wife after marriage has with respect to property, contracts and torts the same capacity and rights and is subject to the same liabilities as before marriage, and in all
actions by or against her she shall sue and be sued in her
own name.
The plaintiff argued that the Code provision was clearly intended to abrogate the common law disability with respect to tort
actions against the husband, while the defendant relied on Minnesota
cases which interpreted a similar statute as leaving the common
law prohibition intact. The court undertook an exhaustive review
of the history of legislative liberalization of the interspousal relation in the territory and in North Dakota, as well as an analysis
of the cases in non-code states construing similarly worded statutes
and concluded that the common law rule was intended to be
abolished altogether.
Read in the light of the common-law principles alone.
there would be, to say the least, good room for argument
to the contrary. This is attested by the formidable array
of authorities cited above, wherein statutes of a more or
less similar character have been thus read and construed.
But taking into consideration the growth and development
of the idea of the emancipation of the wife and the equality
of the husband and wife before the law disclosed by the
history of our legislative enactments, we hold that in this
state the common-law rule is wholly abrogated, and that
a wife may sue her husband for a personal tort...
[S]ection 4411 does more than merely put a married
woman on an equality with her husband with respect to
person, reputation, and property. It recognizes her legal
individuality, and preserves for her every right that she
had prior to her marriage ...
.
It could be pointed out, of course, that the court could
held that the provision itself was clear and did not
pretation. The court acknowledged this, in fact, in
"read by itself without regard for the common law"

simply have
need interstating that
the section
was susceptible of but one interpretation. By refusing to accept
the suggestion that the common law should be given the benefit
of even the remotest doubt, however, the court reaffirmed the
supremacy of the Code where the legislative background militates
against such doubts.
The relationship between the North Dakota Code and the common law was involved instructively in the very recent case of
Nuelle v. Wells, 154 NW.2d 364 (N.D. 1967). There an unemancipated
101.

Fitzmnaurice v. Fitzmnaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 200, 242 N.W. 526, 529 (1932).
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minor sued a truck driver for injuries suffered in an automobile
accident. The defendant filed a third party complaint against the
plaintiff's parents, alleging that they were negligent in operating
the car in which the plaintiff was riding and would therefore be
liable at least in contribution as joint tortfeasors. The trial court
dismissed the third-party complaint for failure to state a cause
of action, in that an unemancipated minor could not sue his parents.
This was the common law view, and the trial court found no
statutory provision removing this disability. The State Supreme
Court reversed, directly applying the provision that there is no
common law in any case where the law is declared by the Code.
The appellate court found the law to be stated in the general
negligence provision,10 2 and two other provisions dealing with parental authority, indicated an intention not merely to lift the
disability in certain special cases, but to limit it to certain specific
cases, of which none applied. The general negligence provision was
found to be unambiguous and therefore not in need of interpretation
in the light of the common law. This case is perhaps the most
forthright vindication of the Code (and indeed after consolidation!)
by application of the no-common-law provision that can be found
in the literature of any of the adopting states.
The single most dramatic event in the life of the Code in both
South and North Dakota, however, was the consolidation of the six
codes (Civil, Criminal, Political, Justices, Civil and Criminal Procedure) into a single mass, in 1939 and 1943 respectively. The
significance of this consolidation is difficult to assess. Obviously,
the Civil Code did not retain a separate identity, and its internal
arrangement was largely destroyed. Indeed, the Revised Statutes
format involved a deliberate abandonment of logical order altogether. In the place of a more or less systematic, logically arranged whole, there was an alphabetically arranged conglomerate
of provisions on various subjects of greatly differing levels of generality. The provisions themselves were largely retained, of course;
in the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943, seventeen of sixty
titles were mostly or entirely made up of provisions from the Civil
Code. Nor was all opportunity for logical arrangement lost, for
many of the titles were broad enough to include large portions of
the Code in substantially the same order as they appeared in the
original. Most of the Division on Persons in the Code is still to
be found in Title 14 on Domestic Relations and Persons in the consolidated code, with Title 34 on Labor and Employment containing
102. N.D. CENT. CoD § 9-10-06 (Civil Code J 979): "Everyone is responsible not only
for the result of his willful acts but also for an injury oqeasioned to another by his want
of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as
the latter, willfully or by want of ordinary care, has brought the Injury upon himself...."
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most of the rest. The general provisions from the Division on
Obligations in the Code are found in Title 9 on Contracts and
Obligations, although much of the material under the heading of
"obligations arising from particular transactions" is scattered
through separate titles on Agency, Carriage, Guaranty and Indemnity, Insurance, Warehousing and Deposits, and of course the Uniform
Commercial Code (formerly Sales). Much of the material from
the Division on Property is found in Title 47 on Property, though
with much less order, and with large chunks removed into separate
titles on Corporations, Liens, Succession and Wills, and Trusts, Uses
and Powers. Many of the provisions in the Fourth Division of
the Code were transported to Title 1 (General Provisions), Title 32
(Judicial Remedies) and Title 42 (Nuisances). Within each title,
the arrangement of the chapters usually, though by no means always, preserves the arrangement which appeared in the Code, so
that consideration of the logic of arrangement can still sometimes
be useful in interpreting the specific provisions.
What is most clearly lost, however, is the overriding idea that
logical arrangement is useful in a written statement of the law.
The alphabetical arrangement of the major units in a collection
of revised statutes is justified primarily because the statutes collected within each such unit can be assumed to have been adopted
separately and as independent units, with concern for other statutes
only to the extent of avoiding (or eliminating) inconsistencies. This
is traditionally the case with statutes in the common law world.
However, not even a revised statute collection would attempt to
break up a single enactment into fragments to be placed under
separate, unrelated headings, for the assumption would be that the
statute passed as a unit was intended to be useful as a unit. It
may be arguable that the old division into six codes was not a
perfect one, and that the constant necessity of crossing the code
lines to resolve particular problems demonstrated a need for rearrangement. To adopt the alphabetical arrangement, however,
is to abandon the search for meaningful arrangement altogether,
and to serve inefficiently that practical lawyer's need which is much
better served by a thorough general index.
The revisers' notes disclose no reason for changing the arrangement of the Code so radically, other than that the system adopted
was that of the United States Code and has been widely accepted
by codifiers of statute-law. Undoubtedly, however, one of the
major reasons that the code format was so willingly abandoned
was that the legislature, in passing new statutes, made no attempt
to incorporate its enactments into the Code format unless it was
amending Code sections. This process had to await the sporadic
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code revisions, which took place with less and less frequency. In
North Dakota, the last revision attempting to re-establish the Code
categories prior to the 1943 consolidation occurred in 1919, and
almost the only one ever undertaken in California was in the 20's
and 30's. The absence of any institution such as a Code Commission
responsible on a continuing basis for incorporating new enactments
into the Code structure-the Dakotas have never had such, and
California has had one only since the late 30's-no doubt made it
inevitable that in time the codes would come to be considered
not as organic wholes but as mere statutes bearing a particular
date and aimed at a particular subject. It is clear, however, that
the effect of this lack on the status of the codes, if not on their
content, has been fundamental.
CONCLUSION
The precise cause of the substantial failure of the 19th century
codification movement has been much speculated over, but the
evidence does not yet justify singling out any one factor. The matter
can be seen in New York as involving chiefly personalities, timing,
and chance: if there had been earlier action by the legislature
(no doubt occupied by post-civil war matters at the time the proposals were submitted), if the governors had not somehow been
persuaded that the draft needed revision before adoption, if there
had not been so much new law in it (though this element in the Code
has been greatly exaggerated), if the chief spokesman had been
a less controversial personality, etc., perhaps the substantive code
would have been adopted and could have had something like the
influence of its predecessor, the Code of Civil Procedure. On a
broader plane, with reference to the American scene generally, it
can be said with Pound that American law was not ready then for
codification, not sufficiently developed in its separate identity to
permit any codification to gain enough sympathy; but I confess
that this reasoning, on the evidence, bears a strong circular aspect.
A more pragmatic notion, related to the historical thesis that
the development of the law must come casuistically, is that the
American legislature, popularly elected and without technical expertise, was not competent to do the job of codifying or of maintaining
the vitality and integrity of a code once adopted. Certainly to the
extent that the debate over codification resolved itself into argument over the relative merits of legislatures and judges as lawmakers, the influential writers and commentators were not prepared
to give the nod to the legislatures. The polemics of the New York
City Bar Association and especially of Pomeroy in California show
little confidence in legislators in this respect. Finally, it is possible
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to believe that the opponents of the code really did find it so inferior
a product as to be unworthy even of the effort to improve. In the
absence of conclusive evidence, I am inclined to emphasize the
first factor, the logically irrelevant, but practically all-important
one of personalities and timing.
In those jurisdictions which adopted the Code, the picture is
somewhat different. Here it cannot be said that the Code failed, for
in those jurisdictions at least the substance remains in effect and
has constantly been used, without obvious disaster. It has been
suggested that the Code provisions have been ignored, in many
respects, at least in California, but only a single instance is cited
without identifying details, and the proposition is one inherently
very difficult to prove. The cases do show a very ambivalent attitude
toward the Code as a source of law, but the courts have neither
ignored it nor flatly repudiated it.
It seems to me that the most important respect in which the
Code has failed, however, is in what Holmes thought the primary
function of codification, namely to lay down a philosophically arranged corpus juris. It would not have been a fatal defect to be
incomplete, if the Code had succeeded in establishing itself as
the philosophical framework over which a complete statement of
the law could be draped; then the inevitable amendments and
supplementary legislation could have been related to the Code
rather than accumulating helter-skelter alongside it. One of the
most telling commentaries on the Code, or on the commentators,
was that of Pomeroy, echoed by J. 0. Muus some years later for
North Dakota, 0 3 to the effect that he found the Code unsuited for
academic use because of its incompleteness, supposed defective
arrangement, and local character. It was never said of this Code
by a teacher, as it was of the French and could have been of the
German, that "I teach only the Civil Code." No doubt a significant
factor for the law student, as Professor Muus suggested, was the
national orientation which became traditional in Ameiican Law
Schools attempting to prepare their students to function anywhere
in the country. So long as the code remained the exclusive property
of four or five jurisdictions, it was bound to be relegated to the
status of local law, to be studied only for particular needs. It
was thus never a source from which the law could be learned and
understood, only one from which it could be ascertained for particular cases. This being so, it is not surprising that no one thought
enough of the Code in the Dakotas, after seventy years of use,
to retain its original form, to improve it rather tLan dissolving it.
103. The Influence of the Civil Code on the Teaching of Law at the University of North
Dakota, 4 DAK. L. ltmv. 175 (1932).

UNCELEBRATED CENTENNIAL

55

It is not clear what the Code would have had to contain in order
to achieve this oracular status which seems essential to the longterm survival of the Code in the continental sense-more detail
or a more rigid use of terminology, as in the German, appended
practical examples of application, as in the Indian Contract Act
and Penal Code, a more readable style, as in the French, perhaps
merely an ongoing commission responsible for its tender care and
feeding-but whatever the lack it was fatal to the complete success
of the venture.
Lying in the background of this philosophical failure is the most
frustrating fact of all, namely the absence in the American legal
literature of any successful attempt at fixing the philosophical
framework of our private law. Holmes searched and did not find,
and neither has anyone else who has tried. This, it would seem,
remains the overriding problem of the time.

